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The Salience of Species Difference
for Feminist Theory
Maneesha Deckha*
INTRODUCTION
The internationally renowned celebrity Pamela Anderson is a
spokesperson for the organization, People for the Ethical Treatment of
Animals ("PETA"). A Canadian by origin, she recently called for a
boycott of Kentucky Fried Chicken Canada ("KFC Canada"). In a video
asking Canadians to stop supporting the company, Anderson informs
viewers that KFC Canada treats its chickens cruelly by permitting its
suppliers to scald the chickens while they are still conscious in order to
defeather them before slaughter, and to inject them with an excessive
amount of unnatural drugs.1 Neither the video, nor Anderson's association
with it, garnered much media attention when first released. That changed,
though, when the CEO of KFC Canada, John Bitove Jr., responded with a
letter to Anderson inviting her out for dinner in order to correct what he
believed was misinformation. In the letter, Bitove referred to Anderson's
new television series, Stacked, by advising Anderson that the facts were
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1. Online video: Pam Anderson KFC Exposd (PETA), KentuckyFriedCruelty.com,
We Do Chickens Wrong, http://www.kentuckyfriedcruelty.com/anderson-vid.asp (last
visited July 8, 2005). Although PETA is an organization committed to animal rights, and
thus is against the instrumental use of animals, it also advocates in the interim for animal
welfare in a wide variety of industries. Thus, it has worked with a number of fast food giants
such as McDonald's and Burger King to persuade them to follow higher standards of animal
care and treatment in their instrumental use. See People for the Ethical Treatment of
Animals, PETA Halts "Murder King" Protests: Burger King Complies with Demand for
Improved Animal Welfare Standards (June 28, 2001), http://www.murderking.com/
release.html (last visited July 8, 2005).
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"stacked" against her. He also told her that he would be happy to keep her
fully "abreast" of the facts.2 Paul Karges, head of the Chicken Farmers of
Ontario, the main supplier to KFC, and thus the representative of the party
Anderson indicts in the video, responded to Anderson's allegations by
noting that, "unlike Pamela Anderson's," his chickens' breasts "are 100%
natural."3
While Pamela Anderson is no icon of feminist movements, the
corporate response to her boycott call should be viewed as a feminist issue.
Most obviously, the incident shows how the efforts of a high profile
woman are obscured by her sexual objectification. Rather than take her
concerns seriously, or respond to her without reference to her personal
attributes, her opponents cannot resist references to her body. That
Anderson has willingly made her name and fortune from her body should
not, I would argue, give license to reduce her to a sexual object in other
spheres of her life even if she willingly uses her sexuality in those spheres
to promote certain social causes.4
But there is another aspect of this incident that most feminist analyses
would not mention: the exploitation of the reproductive labor and slaughter
of the female chickens that Anderson implicitly highlights. With a few
notable exceptions, animals have been left out of feminist analyses.5
Consider, for example, the following comment by another Canadian, Irshad
Manji, discussing the politics of identification:
Many refer to me as a Muslim Lesbian Feminist. Labels
are simple; the politics behind them are anything but.
I cannot deny being an observant Muslim, a committed
queer or a practicing feminist, yet with each label comes a
set of assumptions that, if explored further, would be
punctured... when you make the effort to lift my label
and ask [the] question - "You don't eat meat, do you?"
2. Pam Anderson Spurns Date Offer From KFC Boss, THE BROCKVILLE RECORDER
AND TIMES, May 5, 2005, at B8.
3. Thane Burnett, Recooping a Reputation: Chicken Farmers Getting Bad Rap in
Cruelty Campaign Against KFC, May 6, 2005, at 31.
4. A recent PETA ad pictures a naked shot of Anderson with her back to the camera
and her suggestively made up face looking back over her right shoulder to meet the viewer's
gaze. Her impeccably manicured left hand holds her right arm against her breasts to only
partially cover her right breast. That Anderson is naked despite the snow falling around her
generates the caption for the ad which is to "Give Fur the Cold Shoulder." The image, and
many others available for viewing on PETA's website, could easily be mistaken for Playboy
shots with their soft pornographic aesthetics. See Animals Used for Clothing at
http://www.peta.org/mc/printAds.asp (click on "more" under "Animals Used for Clothing")
(last visited July 8, 2005). Although it is not the focus of this paper, the logical extension of
the argument I make here is to inject more gender and other identity consciousness into
PETA's campaigns. For a critique of PETA's recent ads, see Julie Craig, I'd Rather Go
Naked than Put up with Smarmy PETA Ads, 16 BITCH, Spring 2002, at 13.
5. See the authors discussed below.
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- you give me the right to be acknowledged and the
responsibility to refine or replace your perceptions: "Not
only do I eat meat; this dyke devours Whoppers." Rooted
in caring sufficiently to be sufficiently curious, that
interaction is the mark of belonging.6
"That interaction is the mark of belonging." Manji adduces this
exchange to reveal the harmful effects of stereotypes, prejudice, and
assimilation on Muslims, and other "non-Canadians," that Canadian
multiculturalism policies often foster.7 She, a "practising feminist," sees
this exchange as exemplary of the productive possibility of cross-cultural
understanding and communication. Implicitly, there is nothing troubling
about her answer to the question of whether she consumes dead animals.
Rather, the fact that she devours them is celebrated as a shattering of racist
and sexist stereotypes of "different" Muslims and their passive submissive
women. 8 In this feminist utopian belonging, the suffering of animals is not
important.
What is there to say about assertions such as these by self-identified
feminists? Given that we see human oppression as a problem, why should
we, as scholars and activists committed to resisting other exploitative
dynamics, care about the suffering of nonhuman animals? The answer lies
in the realization that, if we do not, we replicate the same modernist
practices of exclusion that we identify as sources of human oppressions.
Once this is understood, we can comprehend why the sexual objectification
of Anderson in the KFC incident, and the racialization of Manji in the
Burger King Whopper exchange, are not the only feminist issues presented
by these fast food stories. 9 There are intimate connections between human
and animal oppressions such that abjuring animal suffering effectively
disavows human suffering. This occurs through the tolerance of dynamics
within animal oppression that have been held morally objectionable within
critical cultural theory. First, animal oppression relies heavily on a
naturalization of biological difference - an interpretation of ontology that
human rights theorists have held illegitimate with respect to differences
based on race and gender.1° Second, animal oppression is sustained by
6. IRSHAD MANJI, RISKING UTOPIA: ON THE EDGE OF A NEW DEMOCRACY 8-9 (1997).
7. See also Kogila Moodley, Canadian Multiculturalism as Ideology, 6 ETHNIC AND
RACIAL STUDIES 320 (1983).
8. See also Mamia Lazreg, Feminism and Difference: The Perils of Writing as a
Woman on Women in Algeria, 14 FEMINIST STUDIES 81 (1988); Claire Dwyer, Constructions
of Muslim Identity and the Contesting of Power: The Debate Over Muslim Schools in the
United Kingdom, in CONSTRUCTIONS OF RACE, PLACE AND NATION 143 (Peter Jackson & Jan
Penrose eds., University of Minnesota Press 1994).
9. Joan Dunayer, Sexist Words, Speciesist Roots, in ANIMALS AND WOMEN: FEMINIST
THEORETICAL EXPLORATIONS 11, 19 (Carol J. Adams & Josephine Donovan eds., 1995).
10. Louise M. Antony, 'Human Nature' and Its Role in Feminist Theory, in
PHILOSOPHY IN A FEMINIST VOICE: CRITIQUES AND RECONSTRUCTIONS 63 (Janet A. Kourany
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dualistic hierarchies of Enlightenment thought that have entrenched human
oppression 1 so that supporting the former will effectively support the
latter. Third, because of these connections, species oppression intersects
with human-based oppressions so that it is often difficult to undo one
without undoing the other.
Part I of this article examines species difference as a social
construction similar to race, gender and other identity and hierarchy
markers historically understood as biological. To the extent that feminists
(and others concerned with human injustices) criticize naturalized
differences, there is no logical reason to exclude species difference from
this category. In Part II, while not claiming identicalness in the trajectories
of different oppressions, I discuss how the discursive construction of
species difference bears a close resemblance to that of gender and race
narratives. To the extent that feminists and others engaged in cultural
criticism disavow these narratives when applied to humans, there is no
logical reason to support them with respect to animals. This Part canvasses
several important issues within feminist and animal rights movements to
reveal the intersection of species oppression with race and gender
narratives.
The argument, then, relies substantially on consistency and efficiency.
From a spirit of respect and collective struggle for social justice, it asks
feminists, in order to avoid inconsistency and partial analyses, to subject
the narratives and discourses that sustain species difference in our society
to the same close scrutiny they receive when those narratives and
discourses articulate claims about human differences. But while the
argument privileges reason and logic, it calls upon our affective responses
as well to imagine animals as possible candidates for personhood and
rights, and, further, to question why being human should be a qualification
for justice. And while the argument is directed at humans committed to
humans, the goal is to motivate people to include animals in their ethical
horizons not merely because it will create better strategies against human
oppression, but because a line that once seemed immutable now wavers.
PART 1: DECONSTRUCTIONIST DESIRES AND SPECIES
DIFFERENCE
A. THE SELECTIVE NATURE OF DECONSTRUCTION
In the last few decades, academia has witnessed an explosion of
writings critical of human oppressions based on race, gender and the like
informed by, but not strictly adherent to, various critiques of humanism
ed., 1998).
11. Virginia Held, Feminist Reconceptualizations in Ethics, in PHILOSOPHY IN A
FEMINIST VOICE: CRITIQUES AND RECONSTRUCTIONS 92 (Janet A. Kourany ed., 1998).
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from Marxism, poststructuralism, and Derrida's theory of deconstruction.1
2
This type of cultural critique may loosely be termed "the politics of
difference" and signifies a new-fashioned resistance to modernist
narratives.
Distinctive features of the new cultural politics of difference are to
trash the monolithic and homogeneous in the name of diversity,
multiplicity and heterogeneity; to reject the abstract, general and universal
in light of the concrete, specific and particular; and to historicize,
contextualize and pluralize by highlighting the contingent, provisional,
variable, tentative, shifting and changing. Needless to say, these gestures
are not new in the history of criticism. . . yet what makes them novel -
along with the cultural politics they produce-is how and what constitutes
difference, the weight and gravity it is given in representation, and the way
in which highlighting issues like exterminism, empire, class, race, gender,
sexual orientation, age, nation, nature, and region at this historical moment
acknowledges some discontinuity and disruption from previous forms of
cultural critique. 13
The popular mode of deconstruction in North American academia
unpacks, interrogates, and dismembers the discourses resulting from
dichotomous modes of thought endemic to Western philosophy which
normalize a hierarchical social order along a number of axes. Central to
this thought system is the valuation and opposition of reason to emotion,
culture to nature, and man to woman.14 The underlying tenor of most
cultural criticism is aimed at denaturalizing certain sociobiological
discourses that carry pervasive cultural resonance. Enlightenment
discourses, such as the cult of domesticity and social Darwinism,
promulgated the tautology of biological difference. These norms divided
humans according to certain putative natural traits, such as sex and skin
color, and inscribed them within cultural hierarchies of social meaning.
Propertied white European males were posited at the peak of hierarchies
and seen as the most desired model of being. Dualistic thinking provided
the basis for this ideology, wherein the rational, cultural, and masculine
triumphed over the emotional, natural, and feminine Other, who was
morally debased and mentally impaired. Western scientific tradition
maintained this thought system by presenting these cultural dichotomies as
objective truth, ostensibly arrived at through the only recognized legitimate
way to create knowledge-in the realm of science through a pure rational
objectivity unadulterated by emotion or bodily experience.
12. See KAREN GREEN, THE WOMAN OF REASON: FEMINISM, HUMANISM AND
POLITICAL THOUGHT 10-26 (1995) (a fuller elaboration of the convergent and divergent
insights each strand brings to bear in its attack of Enlightenment thought).
13. Cornel West, The New Cultural Policies of Difference, in OUT THERE:
MARGINALIZATION AND CONTEMPORARY CULTURES 19 (Russell Ferguson et al. eds., 1990).
14. GREEN, supra note 12, at 8; Held, supra note 11.
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Cultural critics have painstakingly demonstrated the social
constructedness of sexual, gender, and racial differences whose naturalness
has traditionally been held as objective scientific fact. 15 Yet they have
remained largely uncritical of and have actually embraced the primacy of
the human subject inherent in these sociobiological narratives. As the
"human" construct emerged as a political marker of the type of life
deserving of the utmost value and dignity, marginalized groups sought to
claim this status solidly for themselves. The term "human rights," signifies
the belief that all human individuals are entitled to basic assurance and
protection of their autonomy, dignity and liberty because of their common
humanity. 16 Put differently, possessing the species identity "human" is the
widely accepted and uncontested rationale for receiving respect and rights.
Hence, those who were oppressed by one cultural hierarchy or another
often frame their claims to equal worth and dignity in terms of
humanization, or, more specifically, dehumanization. The current
movement within feminist writing in the international law context is a
prime example. This global feminist movement is aimed at criticizing the
patriarchal nature of international human rights law by showing how
women are excluded systematically from the field's current terms and
practices. The prominent slogan of this campaign is that "women's rights
are human rights."' 7  This discourse is aimed at revealing the male-
centeredness of human rights theory to argue that issues that are
traditionally seen as "women's issues" are in fact human issues as well.
The movement is trying to dislodge the hold androcentric norms have on
15. See e.g,. Linda Alcoff, Cultural Feminism Versus Poststructuralism: The Identity
Crisis in Feminist Theory, 13 SIGNS 405 (1988); JUDITH P. BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE:
FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY (1990); EDWARD D. STEIN, FORMS OF DESIRE:
SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONIST CONTROVERSY (1992); JOHANNES
FABIAN & MATTI BUNZL, TIME AND THE OTHER: How ANTHROPOLOGY MAKES ITS OBJECT
(1983); ALAN HYDE, BODIES OF LAW (1997); IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE
LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1995); BELL HOOKS, BLACK LOOKS: RACE AND
REPRESENTATION (1992); CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES
ON LIFE AND LAW (1987); ANNE MCCLINTOCK, IMPERIAL LEATHER: RACE, GENDER, AND
SEXUALITY IN THE COLONIAL CONTEXT (1995); MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE
DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW (1990); MICHAEL OMI &
HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES FROM THE 1960S TO THE
1980s (1986); Carol Smart, Law, Feminism and Sexuality: From Essence to Ethics?, 9
C.J.L.S. 15 (1994).
16. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A,
at 52-53, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1968) [hereinafter
ICCPR]; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res.
2200A, at 49, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1968) [hereinafter
ICESCR]; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
1244 U.N.T.S. 13 (1979).
17. Chilla Bulbeck, Less than Overwhelmed by Beiing: Problems Concerning
Women's Commonality and Diversity, 6 AUST. FEM. L.J. 31 (1996); HUMAN RIGHTS OF
WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES (Rebecca J. Cook ed., 1994); JULIE
STONE PETERS, WOMEN'S RIGHTS HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES
(Julie S. Peters & Andrea Wolper eds., 1995).
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the human identity to include abuses that are specific to or
disproportionately affect females.
18
To take another example, consider a prominent argument about the
harmful sexist effects of pornography made by Catherine MacKinnon,
arguably the best-known feminist anti-pornography advocate.' 9  She
defines pornography as the graphic, sexually explicit subordination of
women through pictures or words that also includes women dehumanized
as sexual objects, things, or commodities; enjoying pain or humiliation or
rape; being tied up, cut up, mutilated, bruised, or physically hurt; in
postures of sexual submission or servility of display; reduced to body parts,
penetrated by objects or animals, or presented in scenarios of degradation,
injury, torture; shown as filthy or inferior; bleeding, bruised, or hurt in a
context that makes these conditions sexual.2°
MacKinnon is not alone in objecting to pornography because it depicts
women as things.2' Conceivably, there is nothing in the definition of
pornography that bars the interpretation that the argument is against
commodification of all beings. Yet the resistance to accord dignity and
respect to only human bodies was neither the regular motivation nor the
common understanding for feminist arguments. Rather, feminists were
animated by a concern to include women, and only women (i.e., not
nonhuman animals), in this coveted space of personhood occupied by men.
Indeed, the "less than full, human person" depiction of women was the
"reason MacKinnon and Dworkin argued that pornography can and ought
to be controlled as a civil offense, a civil rights violation. '' 22 Articulated
this way, a crucial element of the perceived wrong perpetrated by
sexualized forms of violence against women is the dehumanizing effect of
the violence on the human subject and not simply the violence in and of
itself.
Given the enormous privileges that accompany human status, it is not
surprising that marginalized groups campaign to reveal the partiality of the
common understanding of human and why the term should be broadened to
be more inclusive rather than deconstruct the term itself. Nevertheless, it is
important to remember that there remains a term to be deconstructed rather
than accepted as a natural boundary or concept. What is in need of
questioning is why we terminate our deconstruction at the
18. Hilary Charlesworth, What Are 'Women's International Human Rights'?, in
HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 58, 60 (Rebecca
J. Cook ed., 1994).
19. Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal
Theory, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 304 n.1 (1996).
20. MAcKINNON, supra note 15, at 176 (emphasis added).
21. See, e.g., ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN (1981);
SUSAN M. GRIFFIN, PORNOGRAPHY AND SILENCE (1981).
22. ROSEMARIE PUTNAM TONG, FEMINIST THOUGHT: A COMPREHENSIVE
INTRODUCTION 116 (1st ed. 1989).
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human/nonhuman boundary and why we are not as vigilant in contesting
naturalized boundaries between species as we are between sexes, races,
classes, cultures, etc.
B. HUMANITIES: THE DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTION OF HUMAN BODIES
1. Humanity as Excluding Other Humans
The first way we can begin to understand the human as a constructed
category is to recall that it is only very recently, in terms of historical
periods, that the word "human" has emerged to apply to all human
individuals. As Diana Fuss articulates:
Not until the early eighteenth century does the human
finally stray from its earlier etymological incarnations ....
A sign whose history has rarely been examined, the human
is a linguistic, cultural, and sociopolitical construct of
comparatively recent date. That the human has a history
comes as no surprise to those subjects so routinely and so
violently excluded from its ideological terrain .... Just
who counts as human, and why, underwrites a long saga of
contentious debate within humanist discourse, a discourse
mired from the start in the amalgamated histories of
imperial expansion, scientific experimentation, and
industrial revolution. The human may, in fact, be one of
our most elastic fictions. As the dividing lines between
humans and "nonhumans" have been historically redrafted
to accommodate new systems of classification and new
discourses of knowledge, the human has proceeded to
mutate many times over.23
Fuss reminds us of a history that is pervasively hidden - the category
"human being" is a signifier of a socially constructed group, not a natural
stable, universal or a historical fact of science. Its social construction has
served to disenfranchise many humans, let alone nonhumans, from the
human being status. We need only look to Aristotle's Athens, where non-
slave women and slaves were less than human,2 4 and to American slavery,
where blacks were seen as three-fifths human, to confirm Fuss's point.25
Michel Foucault affirmed that the idea of being human, and humanness
23. Diana Fuss, Introduction to HUMAN, ALL Too HUMAN 1, 1-2 (Diana Fuss ed.,
1996).
24. Lynda Lange, Woman Is Not a Rational Animal: On Aristotle's Biology of
Reproduction, in DISCOVERING REALITY: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON EPISTEMOLOGY,
METAPHYSICS, METHODOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 1, 15 (Sandra G. Harding &
Merrill B. Hintikka eds., 1983).
25. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
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as a category, did not firmly emerge until the eighteenth century in his
argument that the idea of Man arose with the rise of scientific disciplinary
and regulatory power.26 Socio-biological ideas of sameness and difference
between humans and other species, and among humans themselves, became
the determinants of social ordering through the rise of taxonomic, sexual,
and racial classification.27 Biology became destiny with one's destiny
changing as more and more empirical "discoveries" were made about
animal and human bodies during this time. Further, reigning cultural ideas
of difference molded the empirical view. Thomas Laquer, in discussing
sexual difference, details how ideas of natural difference are influenced by
prior cultural discourse on difference:
To be sure, difference and sameness, more or less
recondite, are everywhere; but which ones count and for
what ends is determined outside the bounds of empirical
investigation. The fact that at one time the dominant
discourse construed the male and female bodies as
hierarchically, vertically, ordered versions of one sex and
at another time as horizontally ordered opposites, as
incommensurable, must depend on something other than
even a great constellation of real or supposed discoveries.28
Laquer provides an instance of the constructedness of bodies and of the
political and historic boundedness of the empirical descriptions used to
present scientific facts. In his example of representations of sexual
difference, dominant Enlightenment thought departed from thousands of
years of thinking about human sexual difference such that "[a]n anatomy
and physiology of incommensurability replaced a metaphysics of hierarchy
in the representation of woman in relation to man. 29  Yet the same
scientific evidence that gave rise to pre-Enlightenment understanding had
not been proven false, just as there remained a vast amount of unreported
data that minimized the difference between males and females. 30  The
political, economic, and cultural order was explained selectively by these
natural "facts., 31 So-called objective sociobiological universal ahistoric
truths were "understood to be the epistemic foundation for prescriptive
26. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (Alan
Sheridan trans., Pantheon Books 1979).
27. THOMAS LAQUER, MAKING SEX: BODY AND GENDER FROM THE GREEKS TO FREUD
(1990).
28. Id. at 10.
29. Id. at 6.
30. ANNE FAUSTO-STERLING, MYTHS OF GENDER (1985), cited in LAQUER, supra
note 27, at 9.
31. LAQUER, supra note 27, at 6.
Winter 2006] SPECIES DIFFERENCE FOR FEMINIST THEORY 10
claims about the social order." 32 From this historical evidence, sexual
difference, Laquer argues, "already has in it a claim about gender...; it is
explicable only within the context of battles over gender and power."33
Laquer's example helps to understand the synergy between natural and
cultural discourses and encourages us to be skeptical of scientific claims
about natural differences whether they are cast under the purview of "male
nature," "female nature," or "human nature." 34 They illuminate the blurred
nature of the boundaries demarcating personhood and thing, and therefore
property, in our society.
Of course, cultural critics would easily acknowledge that historical
understandings of humanity have been, and can be still, exclusive of some
humans. As social forces coalesced to vilify, alienate, and then elevate
social groups, Fuss's point that humans have drawn and redrawn the
boundaries of the "human" resonates with concerns regarding intrahuman
oppressions. More difficult to accept is the extent to which the "human"
may be deconstructed and, more precisely, the proposition that the
human/nonhuman border is an artificial one. Surely, a cultural critic might
argue, there is a more marked, tangible, knowable difference between
species than between subgroups of humans. And this, as our jurisprudence
maintains, is the difference that matters. The next section provides an
analysis that disrupts the discourse of natural bodily differences between
humans and nonhuman animals.
2. Humanity as Exclusive of Animality
Just as new science was reshaping cultural ideas of sexual difference, it
formed cultural ideas of species difference. This is the second way in
which the term "human" is revealed to be a social construction. We refer
to ourselves as humans even though science, however flawed it may be,
tells us that we, too, are animals. The critic will argue that we do so
because science also tells us that we are the only animals capable of
reasoning; there is a marked difference between us and nonhuman animals,
which merits the extensive social, legal and economic orderings based on
this distinction. But this argument cannot account for marginal humans -
people who belong to the human species but do not have the capacity to
reason, a supposedly definitive trait of this species. 35 The criterion, reason,
is neither exclusive of all nonhuman animals, such as simians, nor inclusive
32. Id.
33. Id. at 11.
34. The liminal position of fetuses and children also illustrates the constructedness of
the "human." Indeed, the debate over abortion is effectively a contest between the humanity
of the woman and that of her fetus in terms of the treatment and status of personhood that
full humanity accords. See Drucilla Cornell, The Right to Abortion and the Imaginary
Domain, in HUMAN, ALL Too HUMAN 220 (Diana Fuss ed., 1996).
35. DANIEL A. DOMBROWSKI, BABIES AND BEASTS: THE ARGUMENT FROM MARGINAL
CASES (1997).
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of all humans, such as babies or those with severe mental disabilities.
Citing the argument from marginal cases is another way of expressing
the arbitrariness of the human/nonhuman divide along the lines of reason or
any other criteria that may be substituted if reason should be proven
defective. The promise with which reason is held to clearly demarcate
humans from animals, and the value ascribed to it as the uncontested
vehicle of endowment of personhood to humans, are constructed norms.
There is an infinite array of other possible divisions to distinguish among
living beings. As Joan Dunayer explains:
Through the false opposition human vs. animals, humans
maintain a fantasy world in which chimpanzees, snails,
barracudas, and tree frogs are somehow more alike than
chimpanzees and humans .... The evolutionary bush on
which humans occupy one of myriad branches is reduced
to a single stalk, with nonhuman animals mired at its roots
and humans blossoming at its tip. In reality, species do not
evolve toward greater humaneness but toward greater
adaptiveness in their particular ecological niche. Nor is
species something stable and fixed. The human species,
like all others, continues to undergo variation. In
capacities and tendencies humans vary across a vast range
which overlaps with the ranges spanned by other species.
For example, many nonhuman animals possess more
rationality and altruism than many humans. Who can
name a single character trait or ability shared by all
humans but by no other animals? 36
Dunayer's argument is twofold. First, the science of taxonomy,
like other sciences, is not a repository of objective truths but a particular,
contingent method of ordering plant and animal life. The human category
is a species category, but species are not static or natural. Scientists
have grouped some beings together according to certain characteristics they
have considered relevant, while others that would warrant a different
grouping are minimized. This grouping belies difference as natural and is
accorded the rank of universal truth by Enlightenment natural history.
3 7
36. Stephen R.L. Clark, Is Humanity a Natural Kind?, in WHAT IS AN ANIMAL? 17
(Tim M. Ingold ed., 1988); Richard Dawkins, Gaps in the Mind, in THE GREAT APE
PROJECT: EQUALITY BEYOND HUMANITY 80 (Paola Cavalieri & Peter Singer eds., 1993);
MARY MIDGLEY, BEAST AND MAN: THE ROOTS OF HUMAN NATURE (1980), cited in Dunayer,
supra note 9, at 22-23 (Carol J. Adams & Josephine Donovan eds., 1995).
37. Harriet Ritvo, Barring the Cross: Miscegenation and Purity in Eighteenth- and
Nineteenth-Century Britain, in HUMAN, ALL Too HUMAN 37, 38 (Diana Fuss ed., 1996).
Ritvo writes: "The conviction that species were somehow real - that in labeling a group of
organisms with a latinate binomial, taxonomists were identifying an entity that had an
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Dunayer continues:
In our ancestry and genetic composition, we are not merely
like apes; we are apes. Conventionally the classification
"apes" includes two chimpanzee species (common
chimpanzees and pygmy chimpanzees), gorillas,
orangutans, and gibbons-but excludes humans.
According to evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins...
this classification misleads. The African apes
(chimpanzees and gorillas) share a more recent common
ancestor with humans than with Asian apes (orangutans
and gibbons). Therefore, Dawkins explains, no natural ape
category includes African and Asian apes yet excludes
humans. Physiologist Jared Diamond... agrees: "The
traditional distinction between 'apes' (defined as chimps,
gorillas, etc.) and humans misrepresents the facts"....
DNA studies, he points out, have revealed that both
chimpanzee species share a higher percentage of their
genes with humans (about 98.4 percent) than with gorillas
(about 97.7 percent). How, then, can "African ape"
include chimpanzees and gorillas but not humans? The
DNA evidence, Diamond says, indicates that humans are
most accurately classified as a third species of
chimpanzees.38
Drawing upon the work of evolutionary biologists, Dunayer reveals the
tenuousness of a taxonomy that so rigidly and definitively separates
humans from other apes and, indeed, from all other animals. Granted, we
as humans may resemble each other more than we do treefrogs, but the
same "common-sense" observation can be made about elephants - they
also resemble each other more than they do treefrogs. Although we may
think we know a human when we see one, it proves difficult to identify a
characteristic that distinguishes all humans from all other beings, let alone
a characteristic that also provides a convincing justification for why one
group should be treated with inherent respect and the other as mere
property. The recent majority judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in
existence independent of that naming process - flourished in spite of a striking absence of
consensus about the nature of the entity in question, even among those who did not reject it
in principle," citing Peter F. Stevens, Species: Historical Perspectives, in KEYWORDS IN
EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY 302-11 (Evelyn Fox Keller & Elisabeth A. Lloyd eds., 1992); and
SCOTT ATRAN, COGNITIVE FOUNDATIONS OF NATURAL HISTORY: TOWARDS AN
ANTHROPOLOGY OF SCIENCE (1990); ERNST W. MAYR, THE GROWTH OF BIOLOGICAL
THOUGHT: DIVERSITY, EVOLUTION, AND INHERITANCE (1982).
38. Dunayer, supra note 9, at 26 n. 22.
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Harvard College v. Canada39 recognized the former, although, regrettably,
not the latter, insight in denying the patentability of higher life forms. The
fact that the federal Patent Act did not contain a specific exclusion for
humans from patentability and thus offered no lid to close a theoretical
Pandora's box that might open should Canada allow the patenting of higher
life forms, was an important factor supporting the majority's reasoning that
no higher life forms should be patentable.4 In establishing the closeness of
links between humans and nonhumans to legitimize its Pandora's Box
concern, the majority took note of the nearly identical DNA composition
between chimpanzees and humans and of the increasing phenomenon of
xenotransplantation, noting that "scientific development calls into question
the once clear distinction between human and animal life.'
Despite this momentous shift in judicial sensibility, 42 and the genetic
indicators, most of us continue to insist on this definitive human "nature" to
legitimate our privileged position. As Diane Fuss notes, this insistence
reveals the uncertainty and tenuousness we conceal.
The vigilance with which the demarcations between humans and
animals, human and things, and humans and children are watched over and
safeguarded tells us much about the assailability of what they seek to
preserve: an abstract notion of the human as a unified, autonomous, and
unmodified subject. It is as if the alienness of these borderlanders lies not
in their distance from the human, but in their proximity. Sameness, not
difference, provokes our greatest anxiety (and our greatest fascination) with
the "almost human. ' 4
3
Fuss's statement is directly supported by Keith Tester's recent work in
39. Harvard College v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), [2002] 4 S.C.R. 45,
(2002) 219 D.L.R. (4th) 577 [Harvard College cited to S.C.R.].
40. See Patent Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. P-4. This ruling, of course, applies only to mice
or other nonhuman higher life forms as the subject of patent rights, not property rights in
general.
41. Harvard College, supra note 39, at T180.
42. The significance of this statement at the Supreme Court of Canada cannot be
overstated. Prior to Harvard College, the highest level judicial pronouncement of the
relationship between humans and animals came in R. v. Menard, [1978] 43 C.C.C. (2d) 458
at 464, [1978] 4 C.R. (3d) 333 [Menard cited to C.C.C.]. Menard involved the
interpretation of Canada's main anti-cruelty provision, s. 446 of the Criminal Code, which
prohibits "unnecessary suffering" of domestic animals or other privately owned animals. In
attempting to define this term, Lamer J., as he then was, reasoned that humans were justified
in making animals suffer when necessary because they were at the head of the natural food
chain and hierarchy of beings. Menard, id. at 464. Although the Supreme Court of Canada
in Harvard College did not question the property status of animals generally, its finding that
the meaning of "human" is becoming less clear is a refreshingly far cry from statements
invoking religion, God and nature to further entrench a dichotomy between human beings
and all other animals.
43. DONNA JEANNE HARAWAY, PRIMATE VISIONS: GENDER, RACE, AND NATURE IN
THE WORLD OF MODERN SCIENCE (1989); and DONNA JEANNE HARAWAY, SIMIANS,
CYBORGS, AND WOMEN: THE REINVENTION OF NATURE (1991), cited in HUMAN, ALL Too
HUMAN 3 (Diana Fuss ed., 1996).
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Animals & Society. The Humanity of Animal Rights.44 Tester's hypothesis
is that "the concept of animal rights is only marginally concerned with
animals. More importantly, it is part of a social project to classify and
define humanity. '45 Tester's examination of the motivations and norms of
animal advocacy reveals how ideas about the social place of animals were
more about the understanding of what it meant to be a certain type of
human; as attitudes toward animals varied along discontinuous lines of
classification, so did concepts of humanity.46 This critique resonates with
assessments of human-to-human Othering. Postcolonial critics have
showed, for example, how characterizations of "the Orient," the colonies
and "Eastern" societies were equally, if not more, constitutive and
reflective of "Western" identities and anxieties.47 Fuss's and Tester's
points are also affirmed by the current overwhelming abhorrence to the
idea of human reproductive cloning, and the fears that clones and the
posthumanness they portend will challenge the (purported) boundedness,
uniqueness, and generational nature of human beings.48
Hence, there is no natural dividing line between humans and animals.
Cultural critics who find comfort in the stability of species divides need to
reconsider the strength of their assumptions.
3. Humanity as a Fiction
Fuss's assertion that the extent to which we presume a unity and
commonality within humanity may actually suppress crucial contradictions
is also supported by recent cultural criticism on intrahuman identities. The
instability of humanness and the resulting dilemma that we do not actually
know what a human is may seem less of a radical idea if we consider the
recent debate within feminism, among other social movements,49 of the
44. KEITH TESTER, ANIMALS AND SOCIETY: THE HUMANITY OF ANIMAL RIGHTS
(1991).
45. Id. at 48.
46. Id. at 71. Although scholars have aptly criticized Tester for proffering a reductive
encapsulation of animal advocacy in his argument that the movement is only tangentially
concerned with animals and instead has more to with fortifying the identities of animal
advocates as moral superiors, they have recognized this identity-forming function as one
element of the movement. See LYLE MUNRO, CONFRONTING CRUELTY: MORAL ORTHODOXY
AND THE CHALLENGE OF THE ANIMAL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 4-5 (2005).
47. See, e.g., EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM (1979).
48. Dan W. Brock, Human Cloning and Our Sense of Self, SCIENCE, April 12, 2002,
at 314.
49. For a sense of the debate about essentialism within critical race theory, see
Milner S. Ball, The Legal Academy and Minority Scholars, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1855 (1990);
Robin D. Barnes, Race Consciousness: The Thematic Content of Racial Distinctiveness in
Critical Race Scholarship, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1864 (1990); Robert S. Chang, Toward an
Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and
Narrative Space, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CuTrrNG EDGE 322 (Richard Delgado ed.,
1995); Kimberle W. Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988); Jerome M. Culp,
Jr., Autobiography and Legal Scholarship and Teaching: Finding the Me in the Legal
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instability of the signifier "woman" or "women."50 Although we are not so
much concerned here with the details of the essentialism debate within
feminist circles, it is instructive to note how anti-essentialist criticisms of
mainstream feminist theory's use of the term "women" reveal the
instability of what had always appeared a matter of "common sense."
Anti-essentialism is a central tenet for poststructuralists and many
feminists.5 1 The criticism is waged against mainstream feminist theory that
uses the term "women" in a universal sense, claiming to speak for all
women, which anti-essentialists charge is rarely possible. Rather, use of
the word "women" mistakes and conflates the experiences and material
conditions of women in a particular historical and social location for the
Academy, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE 409 (Richard Delgado ed., 1995);
Richard Delgado, Legal Storytelling: Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for
Narrative, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE 64 (1995); RICHARD DELGADO,
'The Imperial Scholar' Revisited: How to Marginalize Outsider Writing, Ten Years Later, in
CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE 401 (1995); Richard Delgado, When a Story is
Just a Story: Does Voice Really Matter?, 76:9 VA. L. REV. 95 (1990); Richard Delgado, The
Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV.
561 (1984); Leslie G. Espinoza, Masks and Other Disguises: Exposing Legal Academia, in
CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE 451 (Richard Delgado ed., 1995); Mari
Matsuda, Affirmative Action and Legal Knowledge: Planting Seeds in Plowed-Up Ground,
11 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1988); Mari Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal
Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987); Deborah W. Post,
Reflections on Identity, Diversity, and Morality, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING
EDGE 419 (Richard Delgado ed., 1995); PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND
RIGHTS: DIARY OF A LAW PROFESSOR (1991). For example of critiques of the critical race
contention that race matters, see Daniel A. Farber & Suzzana Sherry, Telling Stories Out of
School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993); Randall L. Kennedy,
Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE 432
(Richard Delgado ed., 1995).
50. See, e.g., BUTLER, supra note 15; Kimberle W. Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins:
Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV.
1241 (1991); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN.
L. REV. 581 (1990); BELL HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY: FROM MARGIN TO CENTER (1984);
Adrian Howe, White Western Feminism Meets International Law: Challenges/Complicity,
Erasures/Encounters, 4 AUST. FEM. L.J. 63 (1994); Rosemary Hunter, Deconstructing the
Subjects of Feminism: The Essentialism Debate in Feminist Theory and Practice, 6 AUST.
FEM. L.J. 135 (1996); Audre Lorde, The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's
House, in SISTER OUTSIDER: ESSAYS AND SPEECHES 110 (1984); Maria C. Lugones &
Elizabeth V. Spelman, Have We Got a Theory for You! Feminist Theory, Cultural
Imperialism and the Demand for 'The Woman's Voice', 6 WOMEN'S STUD. INT'L J. 573
(1983); Chandra Talpade Mohanty, Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and
Colonial Discourses, in THIRD WORLD WOMEN AND THE POLITICS OF FEMINISM 51 (Chandra
Talpade Mohanty et al. eds., 1991); THIS BRIDGE CALLED MY BACK: WRITINGS BY RADICAL
WOMEN OF COLOR (Cherrie Moraga & Gloria Anzaldfia eds., 1983); Aihwa Ong,
Colonialism and Modernity: Feminist Re-presentations of Women in Non- Western Societies,
3:4 INSCRIPTIONS 79 (1988); ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMEN: PROBLEMS OF
EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT (1988); Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Can the Subaltern
Speak?, in MARXISM AND THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURE 271 (Cary Nelson & Lawrence
Grossberg eds., 1988); TRNH T. MINH-HA, WOMAN, NATIVE, OTHER: WRITING
POSTCOLONIALITY AND FEMINISM (1989).
51. Smart, supra note 15.
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experience of all women. Typically in mainstream feminist theory,
"women" referred to white, middle-class, heterosexual, able-bodied
women, thus excluding women who were marginalized by differences
based on constructs other than gender. Other "women" who were of color,
lesbian, differently abled, elderly, non-Western or low-income were never
invoked under the term "women." Instead they were either subsumed
under non-gendered, and thus masculinized, categories such as Blacks and
gays, or, increasingly, as subgroups of women such as women of color,
lesbians, etc. Differences among women along non-gender lines were
domesticated within mainstream feminist discourse as additives to a
woman's womanhood rather than constitutive of womanhood.52
Anti-essentialists attacked this reductive concept of "women" for
several reasons. First, women who were adversely affected by social
constructs other than gender were kept at the margins of feminist theory
and practice; conceptually, for example, it was hard to imagine racism as a
"women's issue" and so only the needs of a select group of women were
catered to. 53 Second, in speaking of "women" as opposed to "men," a
presumption of commonality between women sufficient to warrant
grouping them together within social analyses developed. Women were
automatically lumped together without cogent analyses examining whether
certain forces existed to warrant a different type of grouping which would
give importance, but not primacy, to gender. 4 This binary grouping, in
which women were framed as the oppressed and men as the oppressors,
disavowed the connections many women had with men because of racism,
poverty, homophobia, nationalisms, religious fundamentalism, etc.-forces
through which women simultaneously occupied positions of privilege and
of oppression.55 Hence, speaking categorically about "women" obscured
the processes by which women oppressed other women and even some
men.
56
In sum, the efforts of anti-essentialists made two points: 1) there is no
natural essence of womanhood that defines "women;" and 2) pitting
women as a group against men as a group is not usually a useful approach
to evaluating and redesigning a social order, since the dichotomy must
erase critical differences among women as a group (and men as a group),
which, if exposed, would undermine its very basis. Anti-essentialist theory
harks back to Simone De Beauvoir's idea that one is not born but made a
woman. 57 Similarly, we can extrapolate that one is not born but made a
52. BUTLER, supra note 15; HOOKS, supra note 50; Howe, supra note 50; Mohanty,
supra note 50; SPELMAN, supra note 50.
53. SPELMAN, supra note 50.
54. Mohanty, supra note 50.
55. Id.
56. SPELMAN, supra note 50.
57. SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX (H.M. Parshley ed. & trans., Vintage
1974) (1961). Note, however, that De Beauvoir was a paradigmatic gender essentialist
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person and a human: there is no natural essence to humanness. Most
feminists accept the first proposition easily these days, but not so much the
latter. Alan Hyde's recent work, Bodies of Law, which argues that the
"human" body only exists in the discursive and not natural realm, is a
convincing treatise to the contrary. 58 Hyde offers a splendid account of the
making of human bodies within American jurisprudence to support his
contention that there is nothing natural about our bodies. Every bodily
experience we have is mediated through discourse and presented back to
us. 59 Although it is naturally occurring, we can only understand, imagine,
and represent it through cultural frameworks. Similarly, we can only
understand the bodies of others through the mediation of discourse.6 °
The impossibility of any one natural trait to demarcate the boundaries
of humanity is well-exposed by the common law, through which Hyde
documents the multiple and often contradictory concepts of the human
body. These "conflicting, competing constructions of the body... as
machine, as property, as consumer commodity, as bearer of privacy rights
or of narratives, as inviolable, as sacred, as object of desire, as threat to
society" defy its popular status as a natural entity performing natural
functions and challenge the view that humans are a coherent whole of
sameness. 61 As Hyde, echoing Fuss above,62 insists:
It follows that the body is not the best but the worst
standpoint for defining legal subjects .... When we see a
culture self-consciously defining bodies, it is already in
trouble. We define bodies in the first place only when we
are conflicted, as a society and often within ourselves.
When body boundaries become problematic and need
definition, when we worry about whether blood or urine
"is" the body, when we try to define the body's availability
to state authority, to be searched or medicated, we do not
draw on any strong social consensus about the nature and
boundaries of the body, though it often pleases us to talk
as if we do. We draw instead on the multiple conflicting
constructions of the body available to any mature speaker
and pretend that we have resolved our social and internal
conflicts by deploying one or another metaphor,
for example by describing the body as "inviolable" rather
because she only emphasized how women were affected by gender relations and nothing
else. See SPELMAN, supra note 50, at 57-79.
58. HYDE, supra note 15.
59. Id. at 6.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Fuss, supra note 23.
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than merely "private. 63
Hyde proffers the example of the varied legal understandings of the
body as an entry to denaturalizing the human body. His move mirrors
Dunayer's comparison of human bodies with animal bodies to demonstrate
the artificial difference. Hyde helps us even further by highlighting the
anxiety engendered by our inability to categorically and permanently name
our difference as humans. As both Hyde and Fuss point out, the repetition
with which our legal judgments and legislation affirm the sanctity of
human life, or speak of the "human race," may say more about the
contested nature of being human. This subsistence of the natural narrative,
despite ample legal evidence to the contrary, betrays the presumptive and
fictive aspects of human unity that ground our widely different treatment of
those not categorized as human.
C. SUMMARY
All of this is not to say that there are no biological "truths" or "facts."
For example, it is possible to say that only females have the capacity to
become pregnant and give birth, although this is not a trait particular to
human females! The foregoing is also not to deny that there are among
humans statistically prominent traits which, notwithstanding their non-
universality, distinguish humans from other animals (for example, only
non-infant humans stand upright on two legs). Some cultural critics even
posit the capacity for language as a universal among all humans.64 Even if
we concede language or some other feature as a human universal, my
argument does not depend on refuting this theory of a shared trait between
all humans that can fill the signifier "humans" and may even amount to a
qualified claim about human nature or what it is to be human.
65
Instead, Part I has served to argue two simple points, the first one
explicitly. Following conventional lines of analysis in cultural criticism,
the "human" is a socially constructed category, not a natural or biological
63. HYDE, supra note 15, at 11.
64. Antony, supra note 10, at 84-85. She qualifies this statement by noting "while
we cannot say that all human beings, without exception, speak a language, and while no one
language can sensibly be thought closer to "natural" than any other, it is still the case that
there is, in the case of language, a genuine human universal" (footnotes omitted). But as
animal advocates have noted, animals also share the capacity for language - the sounds
they make are just different from ours and from each other's. For more on the discussion of
the linguistic abilities of animals and why language is not a valid source of "natural" or
moral differentiation between humans and animals, see Thomas G. Kelch, Toward a Non-
Property Status for Animals, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 531, 569-72 (1997-98).
65. Antony, supra note 10, at 84-85. Antony is critical of the Enlightenment-derived
pleas to nature to legitimate social oppression, but she creatively argues that a human nature,
which is inherently a product of one's environment from the onset, can be said to exist,
perhaps even universally. I do not attempt to respond to this part of her argument as it is not
threatening to my own. What I want to discuss is whether the theoretical coherent "human,"
if such a thing exists, should matter to a theory of anti-oppression.
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one. This is apparent in three ways. First, understandings of who is
"human" have historically excluded many individuals currently viewed as
human today. Second, "natural" differences are overblown into artificial,
immutable, and universal constructs of gender, race, class, sexuality, etc.,
which are presented as innocently natural such that women are from Venus,
men are from Mars, and humans are not animals.66 Species and ideas of
humanness are social constructs similar to other intrahuman identity social
locations that should be similarly deconstructed for the differences that are
denied in order to facilitate one type of categorization over another. The
"human" is a term that has been both deliberately constructed as exclusive
of some humans and all animals despite valid and compelling reasons to
alter its defining contours. Third, there is no essence to being a "human."
However the term is defined, it is always already incomplete and partial: a
product of biological facts filtered through cultural discourses. The
"human," like the "woman" or the "man," is imagined. Once cultural
critics accept this insight with regard to animals as it has been accepted for
humans, it should dissuade them from assigning moral and legal
importance to any source of biological difference we ascribe to animals.
Whatever biological difference one can trot out to distinguish x beings from
y beings has no social meaning of superiority or inferiority until we
construct it as such and choose to "see" the difference.
The next Part seeks further to bridge the distance cultural critics see
between humans and animals, but does so through a different route.
Instead of appealing to cultural critics by arguing tlat humanness and
species difference is every bit as naturalized a difference in need of
deconstruction as Part I did, Part II discusses two other methodological
perspectives important in much cultural criticism, nondichotomous
thinking and intersectionality, also challenging the accuracy and coherence
of the human/nonhuman divide.
PART 2: STRUCTURAL CONNECTIONS: SPECIES AS A
SOCIAL FORCE
Cultural critics should be wary of excluding animals because the
justificatory strategies that exclude animals today share an intimate history
with those that exclude(d) marginalized humans. More precisely, the social
meanings ascribed to abjected animal bodies were and are generated from
the same discourses which produce(d) abjected human bodies. I wish to
stress that I am not claiming that all oppressions emerge from the same
historical trajectories and are identical in operation. Indeed, the difference
makes is differentiated depending on the difference. 67 Just as the inclusion
66. Id.
67. Mary Eaton, Abuse by Any Other Name: Feminism, Difference, and Intralesbian
Violence, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE: THE DISCOVERY OF DOMESTIC
ABUSE 195, 196 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994).
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of animals into our moral community requires different responses than an
inclusion of a human subgroup (e.g., no one would argue for giving
animals the right to vote) the genealogies of their exclusion converge and
diverge with those of human oppressions.68 Similarly, modernist
discourses and practices among types of human oppression are often
contradictory and inconsistent, displaying exclusions, tensions and fissures.
This is the nature of power - diffuse, scattered, and contradictory,
mediated by contingencies of time, space and culture. 69 Yet to recognize
the dynamic and unpredictable workings of power does not efface the
hegemonic ideologies and institutions which produce it. For example,
different subgroups of women experience gender oppression in different
and conflicting ways, but this does not deny that they are all adversely
affected by a gender hierarchy that favors men.70  For purposes of my
argument, I shall discuss elements of animal oppression in Western
societies that are similar to human oppression and which cultural critics
impugn in the context of human oppression but permit in the context of
animal oppression.
A. PLEAS TO NATURE
Perversely, our society justifies mistreatment of animals with pleas to
nature. We permit the disembodiment and fragmentation of animals
because they are widely figured as wholly different types of biological
bodies. Perverting Darwin's theory of evolution in ON THE ORIGIN OF
SPECIES (1 859),71 an evolutionary hierarchy and the natural food chain are
common arguments marshaled to justify human domination.72 Under this
68. As Marjorie Spiegel cautions in discussing the similarities in treatment between
American blacks and animals: "there are distinct social, political, and economic factors
which create and support the subjugation of animals, as well as differences between the
possible manners in which blacks and animals could respond to their respective
enslavements. On this latter point, one very notable difference is exemplified by the history
of slave rebellions. While there are innumerable instances of animals having escaped from
zoos, circuses, slaughterhouses, etc., animals' natures vis-A-vis humans seem to preclude the
possibility of organized rebellion, while enslaved blacks managed to overcome
overwhelming odds and stage rebellions and innumerable organized escapes. But, as
divergent as the cruelties and the supporting systems of oppression may be, there are
commonalities between them. They share the same basic essence, they are built around the
same basic relationship - that between oppressor and oppressed." MARJORIE SPIEGEL, THE
DREADED COMPARISON: RACE AND ANIMAL SLAVERY 24 (1988).
69. MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS AND OTHER
WRITINGS, 1972-1977 (Colin Gordon ed., Pantheon Books 1980), discussed in Amy Allen,
Foucault on Power: A Theory for Feminists, in FEMINIST INTERPRETATIONS OF MICHEL
FOUCAULT 265 (Susan J. Hekman ed., 1996).
70. Sabina Sawhney, Essentialism is Such a Drag!, in FEMINISM BESIDE ITSELF 197
(Diane Elam & Robyn Wiegman eds., 1995).
71. Thomas Kelch notes, "That humans and other animals share similar mental
capacities was recognized by Darwin [who] ... contended that the differences in respective
mental capacities were a matter of degree, not kind."(footnotes omitted), supra note 64, at
563.
72. Kelch, supra note 64, at 559.
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theory, domination is legitimate and apolitical because it is a dictate of
nature beyond human agency. This device is not peculiar to human
oppression of animals. An array of Western, mainly Enlightenment
philosophers, developed a vision of universal human justice that excluded
women and non-elite men from the qualification of humanity. Aristotle,
Rousseau and Kant accomplished this exclusion on the purported basis of
reason.7 3 Not desiring to relegate women to a different species altogether,
they conceded that women and men shared a common human nature but
insisted that women were naturally defective as humans because they had
an impaired development of humanity's defining trait - reason. Thus men
became the exemplars of human nature while women, if they followed their
prescribed roles and demonstrated the appropriate virtues complementary
to those of men, became exemplars merely of women, not humans. 74
Louise K. Antony explains how appeals to nature enabled this historical
norm of gender differences to signal cohesive theories of justice rather than
perversions of injustice.
What's gone wrong? Theories that seemed to promise a grounding for
universal equality transmute before our eyes into rationalizations for the
exploitation of women by men. In fact, there is nothing unusual here.
Historically, it's been a standard strategy for explaining and justifying
oppressive social hierarchies to appeal to alleged differences between the
"natures" of oppressors and oppressed. This strategy is extraordinarily
labile, exploiting in turn each of the precarious normative and modal
connotations carried by the notion of "the nature," depending on the point
that needs making. The trick is in picking the right stratagem at the right
time.75
Exploring the content of the meaning of "natural" animal differences
from humans reveals even more similarities. A primary justificatory
strategy in support of the property status of animals is the perception of
animals as bodies with defective capacities to reason or, more precisely, to
engage in, as Thomas Kelch terms it, "deliberative rationality". 76 The
above discussion also suggests how a perceived defective capacity to
reason has figured decisively in excluding humans along lines of gender,
racial, ability and age. When Aristotle, followed by Descartes centuries
later, theorized that animals were to be put in the service of humans
because of their irrationality, 77 the arguments were extended to women and
73. Antony, supra note 10, at 63.
74. Id. at 64.
75. Id. at 65.
76. Kelch defines "deliberative rationality" as one that "requires that the creature is
introspective, self-aware, and able to engage in self-analysis" [footnote omitted]. He
contrasts it with the less sophisticated version of "relational rationality" which "includes
memory and the ability to respond based upon that memory." Kelch, supra note 64, at 565.
77. Martha C. Nussbaum, Animal Rights: The Need for a Theoretical Basis, 114
HARV. L. REV. 1506, 1548-49 (2001) (reviewing STEVEN M.WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE:
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to inferior men. One of the most ingrained legacies of Enlightenment
thought is dualistic thinking and the hierarchical continuums organized
around the dualisms, where one concept is given superiority over the
other.78 These dualisms can be traced back to postmedieval thought and
the beginnings of objectivist scientific epistemology, which framed social
life in mechanistic rather than organic terms. It is Descartes, however, who
is properly credited with taking to the extreme the split of the bodily state
from the mental state. 79 Descartes advanced the theory that human minds
were separate from and controlled human bodies. The mind, associated
with rationality, was superior to the irrational and emotional state of the
body. Reason, not feeling, sentiment, or emotion, could procure universal
truths. Animals, considered by Descartes to be incapable of reasoning,
were then simply mechanistic bodies.8°
The Cartesian mind/body split has obvious adverse implications for
women, people of color, the environment and animals, beings who have
been historically reduced to their bodies. Correlated with the culture/nature
and the masculine/feminine dichotomies, it has been a crucial site of
deconstruction for cultural critics since 1944, when Max Horkheimer and
Theodor Adorno8 1 critiqued the devaluation of women and Nature and the
valorization of domination by scientific rationalism. Since then, cultural
critics working within various traditions have criticized the Cartesian
mindset. Feminists from all schools, except perhaps the liberal and cultural
ones, have argued that the dualistic thinking which associates man with
reason and culture and woman with emotion and nature has worked to deny
82
women equal respect and dignity. The critique of the public/private
dichotomy that these associations generated, naturalizing the relegation of
woman to her biology within the private sphere, is a mainstay of the
feminist diet.83  Indeed, the genesis of Western feminism is heavily
TOWARD LEGAL RIGHTS FOR ANIMALS (2000)).
78. CAROL J. ADAMS, NEITHER MAN NOR BEAST: FEMINISM AND THE DEFENSE OF
ANIMALS (1994); CAROL J. ADAMS, THE SEXUAL POLITICS OF MEAT: A FEMINIST-
VEGETARIAN CRITICAL THEORY (1990); ANIMALS & WOMEN: FEMINIST THEORETICAL
EXPLORATIONS (Carol J. Adams & Josephine Donovan eds., 1995); Josephine Donovan,
Animal Rights and Feminist Theory, in BEYOND ANIMAL RIGHTS: A FEMINIST CARING ETHIC
FOR THE TREATMENT OF ANIMALS 34 (Carol J. Adams & Josephine Donovan eds., 1996);
ECOFEMINISM, WOMEN, ANIMALS, NATURE (Greta Gaard ed., 1993); Roger J.H. King,
Caring About Nature: Feminist Ethics and the Environment, in ECOLOGICAL FEMINIST
PHILOSOPHIES 82 (Karen J. Warren ed., 1996); Val Plumwood, Nature, Self and Gender:
Feminism, Environmental Philosophy and the Critique of Rationalism, 6 HYPATIA 3 (1991).
79. Donovan, supra note 78, at 41-43.
80. Nussbaum, supra note 77.
81. MAX HORKHEIMER & THEODOR ADORNO, DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT (John
Cumming trans., Continuum 1972), cited in Josephine Donovan, Animal Rights and
Feminist Theory, in BEYOND ANIMAL RIGHTS: A FEMINIST CARING ETHIC FOR THE
TREATMENT OF ANIMALS 34, 41 (Carol J. Adams & Josephine Donovan eds., 1996).
82. Dorothy E. Chunn & Dany Lacombe, Introduction to LAW AS A GENDERING
PRACTICE 1 (Dorothy E. Chunn & Dany Lacombe eds., 2000).
83. TONG, supra note 22.
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interwoven with the rise of scientific discourses championing rationality.
As Donna Haraway tells us,
European-derived feminist and antifeminist debates
proliferating from the late eighteenth century located
themselves on the terrain of the meaning of sexual
difference. The history of this modem feminism would be
incomprehensible without the history of modem
reproductive biology and clinical gynecology-as a moral
discourse about social order and as a social technology.
Evolutionary discussions were part of this larger discursive
frame. In antifeminist discourse wherever the boundaries of
old hierarchies were threatened by new Enlightenment
liberal doctrines of universal man, biological sexual and
racial difference reimposed "natural" limits.
84
Haraway points us to the interrelatedness of Enlightenment thinking,
cultural hierarchies and human emancipatory politics. The feminism of
white middle-class women took a distinctly liberal approach in response to
the excess of difference that Western science began implacably to
naturalize. Prior to the late eighteenth century, European males and
females "were almost universally regarded as homologous ... the female
was a kind of male turned inside."85 The female was seen as an inferior
model of her species, but she was not yet regarded as different and
oppositional to her male counterpart until scientific truth stamped her as
such.
The "inherent" defect in reason effectively curtailed the entitlement of
women and other marginalized groups to moral claims provided by the
emergent liberalism. These naturalized differences and the life conditions
they created for liberally abject bodies remains a prime concern for
feminist interrogation. 86 Yet few subject the idea of naturalized species
difference to the same scrutiny. This is all the more peculiar when we
consider that hierarchies structured around gender, race, class, etc. often
depend on species constructs to work.
B. INTERSECTIONALITY
Intersectionality is a theory associated with the writings of Critical
Race feminists working in law.87 It also catches the thrust of the critiques
84. Donna Jeanne Haraway, Investment Strategies for the Evolving Portfolio of
Primate Females, in BODY/POLITICS: WOMEN AND THE DISCOURSES OF SCIENCE 139, 148
(Mary Jacobus et al. eds., 1990).
85. Id. at 147; LAQUER, supra note 27, at 4.
86. Chunn & Lacombe, supra note 82.
87. See generally CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: A READER (Adrien Katherine Wing ed.,
2nd ed. 2003).
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of white Western mainstream feminism by North American women of
color, lesbians, and non-Western women, to complicate critical analyses by
looking at gender as a social force that works in tandem with other social
forces. 88 The word invites the metaphor of a traffic intersection where
multiple roads converge into one. Intersectionality is a theory that prompts
us to look at any given problem, as well as a person's experience of that
problem, as an intersection where social forces meet to construct any
particular experience. Some critics committed to intersectionality have
chosen to forego the term because it obscures another central point of the
theory - that social forces do not operate in isolation. More accurately, a
social force is structured by other social forces such that it is impossible to
understand, say, gender as a construct without considering race.
8 9
Feminists and other theorists working within postcolonial and antiracist
traditions have chronicled this meaning of intersectionality with respect to
British Empire-building. They discuss how European imperialism's main
justificatory strategy was the white man's burden to uplift the darker races,
who were seen as closer to Nature, bestial and barbaric, and thus in need of
rational civilization and domination.9" Colonized women, and their
perceived deep affiliations with the natural, the instinctual, and the animals,
were a crucial element in the production and reproduction of Empire.
Saving brown women from the barbaric customs of brown men was a
potent justification for the civilizing mission.9' Further, the discourse of
Empire imagined lands inhabited by indigenous peoples (and other beings)
as Nature in its most virginal state, ready for and in need of civilized
masculine domination.92
Anne McClintock captures the essence of these postcolonial feminist
critiques when she writes:
The myth of the virgin land is also the myth of the empty
land, involving both a gender and a racial dispossession.
Within patriarchal narratives, to be virgin is to be empty of
88. See generally FEMINIST POSTCOLONIAL THEORY: A READER (Reina Lewis & Sara
Mills eds., 2003).
89. SHERENE H. RAZACK, LOOKING WHITE PEOPLE IN THE EYE: GENDER, RACE, AND
CULTURE IN COURTROOMS AND CLASSROOMS 13 (1998).
90. Chinua Achebe, Colonialist Criticism, in HOPES AND IMPEDIMENTS: SELECTED
ESSAYS, 1965-1987, at 81 (1988); FRANTZ FANON, BLACK SKIN, WHITE MASKS (Charles
Lam Markmann trans., 1967); PETER HULME, COLONIAL ENCOUNTERS: EUROPE AND THE
NATIVE CARIBBEAN 1492-1797 (1986); SAID, supra note 47; Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak,
Three Women's Texts and a Critique of Imperialism, 12:1 CRITICAL INQUIRY 243 (1985);
TRINH T. MINH-HA, supra note 50; Mohanty, supra note 50.
91. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, French Feminism in an International Frame, in IN
OTHER WORLDS: ESSAYS ON CULTURAL POLITICS 134 (1987). For a discussion of how the
"white man's burden" is being replayed in the realm of Canadian gender persecution
refugee claims, see Sherene H. Razack, Domestic Violence as Gender Persecution: Policing
the Borders of Nation, Race, and Gender, 8:1 C.J.W.L. 45 (1995).
92. MCCLINTOCK, supra note 15.
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desire and void of sexual agency, passively awaiting the
thrusting, male insemination of history, language and reason.
• . . Within colonial narratives, the eroticizing of "virgin"
space also effects a territorial appropriation, for if the land is
virgin, colonized peoples cannot claim Aboriginal territorial
rights, and white male patrimony is violently assured as the
sexual and military insemination of an interior void.... The
colonial journey into the virgin interior reveals a
contradiction, for the journey is figured as proceeding
forward in geographical space but backward in historical
time, to what is figured as a prehistoric zone of racial and
gender difference. One witnesses here a recurrent feature of
colonial discourse. Since indigenous peoples are not
supposed to be spatially there-for the lands are "empty" -
they are symbolically displaced onto what I call
anachronistic space, a trope that gathered.. . full
administrative authority as a technology of surveillance in
the late Victorian era. According to this trope, colonized
people-like women and the working class in the
metropolis-do not inhabit history proper but exist in a
permanently anterior time within the geographic space of the
modem empire as anachronistic humans, atavistic, irrational,
bereft of human agency - living embodiments of the
archaic "primitive. "
93
McClintock describes the binary framework underlying imperialism:
man/woman; colonizer/colonized; nature/culture; and reason/emotion. She
then proceeds to demonstrate the "dangerous liaisons" that these
dichotomies created, connecting people though a matrix of gender, race and
class constructs that defies simple binary categorization. McClintock's
work in Imperial Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial
Context rejects traditional Western binaries and reveals how social
constructs cannot be understood in isolation from each other.94 She argues
that the categories conventionally invoked in isolation by cultural critics to
study social power and identity formation (notably gender, race, class, and
sexuality) only emerge as vehicles of power in relation to one another.
McClintock carefully traces the genealogies of colonial difference and their
implications for abject humans, yet she, like her colleagues, leaves the
species angle unexamined.
As Carol Adams, Josephine Donovan, and other ecofeminists
document, 95 we need to revisit such sorts of analyses to uncover how our
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See generally, ADAMS, THE SEXUAL POLITICS OF MEAT, supra note 78; ANIMALS
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social lives are constituted not only by race, class, and gender axes, but
species as well. It is instructive to examine these interconnections of
difference with animals by considering several issues well-canvassed by
cultural critics: pornography, intimate violence, knowledge production
through language (naming), and neoimperialism.
1. Pornography
Pornography is a hotly debated subject among feminists. On the one
hand, there are those who oppose the degrading objectification of women
in pornographic materials and its arguable subsequent harm to women in
their daily lives. On the other side are those concerned with the censorship
of the sexual expression of women and the denial of the exercise of agency
that women make even under conditions of oppression.96 I focus here on
the first set of feminist arguments criticizing pornography to illuminate
how, on its own terms, the degradation of women that feminists impugn is
structured by speciesism.
The conventional feminist critique views pornography as a vehicle
within a misogynistic culture to eroticize male dominance, to support the
ideology that women enjoy male violence, and to shape harmful cultural
images of women's "nature" in support of gender roles legitimating male
dominance.97 The critique merged, and is still most commonly associated,
with radical feminism, which largely defines women's oppression based on
gender "arising from stark inequalities of power realized and expressed
through men's sexual coercion of women." 98  Theories of women's
oppression which privilege a gender oppression constituted by sexual
relations, now referred to as "dominance feminism,"99 have come under
sharp scrutiny by critics for sidelining the other forces which constitute the
political identity of women, notably race, class, and sexuality oppression.
100
For now, recall MacKinnon's definition of pornography above and how
it framed the injustice as a dehumanization of women. 101 Many of the
representations of women that anti-pornographers denounce depict women
AND WOMEN, supra note 78; Greta Gaard, "Vegetarian Ecofeminism" (2002) 23:3 Frontiers
117.
96. The anti-censorship feminists run the gamut from "supportive critics" of
traditional feminism who call themselves feminists to "stark antagonists" who belittle
conventional feminist theories of male domination. Abrams, supra note 19, at 304 n. 1. For
a detailed discussion of the genesis and implications of this debate for feminism as a
movement and women's subjectivity, see Abrams, supra note 19; and TONG, supra note 22,
at 112-13.
97. SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILLS: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE (1975);
DWORKIN, supra note 21; MACKINNON, supra note 15; and CATHERINE A. MACKINNON,
TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989), cited in TONG, supra note 22, at 308
(1989).
98. TONG, supra note 22, at 308.
99. Id.
100. Hunter, supra note 50.
101. MAcKINNON, supra note 15, at 98-100 and accompanying text.
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being treated as we commonly treat animals.10 2 In a sense, MacKinnon
(and all others who use the dehumanization argument) acknowledges that
pornography is an animal issue, because her critique seeks to elevate
women to the dignity reserved for men while leaving animals behind to be
treated indiscriminately as nonhumans are in Western culture. In
portraying women as animals, such as Playboy bunnies, or in animal-like
conditions and positions, pornography is creating a discourse centered and
dependent not just on norms of gender difference, but also on those of
species difference. -In other words, the message of women's submission to
the male violence would be difficult to understand without the associations
that we are invited to make of women as inferior animals. As Carol Adams
has noted in her groundbreaking work linking the consumption of animals
with the consumption of pornography,10 3 this kind of insight does not figure
in most feminist critiques of pornography despite the lack of nonspeciesist
reasons for its absence.
2. Intimate Violence
There are many theories of the etiology of violence against women in
their intimate relationships and how best to fashion solutions to eliminate
it.1°4 As with pornography, most feminist analyses of intimate violence
exclude animals from their lens. Conventional feminist accounts of
intimate violence identify the root in the public/private dichotomy of
patriarchal liberalism and the sanctity of the institutions of marriage and
family that it established. The dichotomy denies that marriage and the
family are crucial loci of women's oppression and examples of the "social
structures that create and sustain unequal power relations between men and
women."'' 05 Mainstream feminists highlight the historical roots of intimate
violence where cultural and legal sanctions accorded to men marital rights
and privileges to brutally discipline and rape their wives. 10 6 Similar gender
roles today, which confine women to the private sphere and economic
dependency, are seen to authorize the use, if not the abuse, of patriarchal
power. 10 7 Thus, feminists worry that the violence is likely to continue as
long as unequal gender relations and their norms of privacy and economic
dependence remain intact.
Mainstream feminists have sought to dispel the private image of
102. ADAMS, THE SEXUAL POLITICS OF MEAT, supra note 78.
103. Id.
104. HOLLY JOHNSON, DANGEROUS DOMAINS: VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN
CANADA (1996).
105. Id. at 21 (emphasis added).
106. R. EMERSON DOBASH & RUSSELL P. DOBASH, VIOLENCE AGAINST WIVES
(1979); JOHNSON, supra note 104, at 21-22; Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of
Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 973 (1991); Regina. v. R., [1991] 3 W. L.R. 767 (H.L.), appeal
dismissed, [1992] 1 A.C. 599.
107. JOHNSON, supra note 104.
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intimate violence by emphasizing the gendered power dynamics of the
violence. 08 As with pornography, critiques have emerged within feminism
disputing the privileged position of gender within analyses of women's
oppression. These critiques illustrate how intimate violence should be
viewed as not only a matter of male dominance but also of other forms of
domination, drawing links between the production of intimate violence and
imperialism, homophobia, and child abuse. 0 9 bell hooks makes this claim
when she writes:
While I agree.., that male violence against women in the
family is an expression of male domination, I believe that
violence is inextricably linked to all acts of violence in this
society that occur between the powerful and the powerless,
the dominant and the dominated. While male supremacy
encourages these of abusive force to maintain male
domination of women, it is the Western philosophical notion
of hierarchical rule and coercive authority that is the root
cause of violence against women, of adult violence against
children, of all violence between those who dominate and
those who are dominated. It is this belief system that is the
foundation on which sexist ideology and other ideologies of
group oppression are based; they can be eliminated only
when this foundation is eliminated. "10
Indeed I would agree. Yet, despite the existence of a similar oppressor-
oppressed relationship, hooks's "all acts of violence" do not include human
violence against the nonhuman.
The reliance of intimate violence on speciesist practices also merits the
inclusion of speciesism in any critical review of intimate violence. Carol
Adams has theorized these connections and details how animals are
frequently used in intimate violence. Animals are used in multiple ways: as
target practice to terrorize the woman by enacting her future fate; as
recipients of the violence meant for her; as relational pawns in constraining
women to endure abusive relationships out of fear that the abuser will
retaliate against the animal if they leave or disobey; as symbols of the
man's power to destroy what/whom she loves; as a weapon to beat her; and
as instruments of rape to penetrate and humiliate her."' This last instance
108. DOBASH & DOBASH, supra note 106; Eaton, supra note 67, at 208-11; JOHNSON,
supra note 104, at 21-23; Schneider, supra note 106; GILLIAN A. WALKER, FAMILY
VIOLENCE AND THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT: THE CONCEPTUAL POLITICS OF STRUGGLE 96, 105
(1990).
109. HOOKS, supra note 50; Eaton, supra note 67, at 208-11; Crenshaw, supra note
50.
110. HOOKS, supra note 50, at 118.
111. Carol J. Adams, Woman-Battering and Harm to Animals, in ANIMALS &
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of forced sex with animals illustrates well how intimate violence (and
pornography which often precedes the violation) and animal oppression are
interrelated. Adams describes the extent of the violence:
From the abuser's point of view, he is sexually using an
animal as an object, just as others may use baseball bats or
pop bottles. The animal's status as object is what is
important in this instance. But, then, so is the woman's.
Objects used for sex in this way, including animals and the
women victims, are denied individuality, uniqueness,
specificity, particularity. It is not who they are that matters
as much as what can be accomplished through the use of
them. Forcing sex between his human female partner and
a nonhuman animal reveals the way that a batterer
objectifies both of them so that they have become
interchangeable objects. They become to him no different
- and no less expendable - than a pop bottle.'1 2
This use of animals in intimate violence is not just another case of the
instrumental status of animals. Rather, as Adams makes clear, the violence
against animals is an important form of intimate violence. Both woman
and animal are violated because each occupies an inferior position in the
mind of the abuser. A society that values certain human males over
everyone else exposes women to vulnerability and violence by permitting
violence against her companion animal. Put differently, what would it
mean to say that intimate violence was eliminated yet animals were still
being killed in front of the human female partners of abusers? This type of
intimate violence cannot be explained by the sanctity of family privacy
which is given primary explanatory force in most feminist accounts. We
need the injection of human oppression against animals to fully
comprehend the extent of intimate violence.
3. Naming
None were left now to unname, and yet how close I felt to
them when I saw one of them swim or fly or trot or crawl
across my way or over my skin, or stalk me in the night, or
go along beside me for a while in the day. They seemed far
closer than when their names had stood between myself and
them like clear barrier: so close that my fear of them and
their fear of me became one same fear. And the attraction
that many of us felt, the desire to smell one another's smells,
WOMEN: FEMINIST THEORETICAL EXPLORATIONS, supra note 78, at 55, 60-69.
112. Id. at 67.
Winter 2006] SPECIES DIFFERENCE FOR FEMINIST THEORY 30
feel or rub or caress one another's scales or skin or feathers
or fur, taste one another's blood or flesh, keep one another
warm - that attraction was not all one with the fear, and the
hunter could not be told from the hunted, nor the eater from
the food." 3
The practice of naming is frequently an act of domination. 114 Language
is a prominent conveyor of cultural imagery, and cultural critics have
contested the formal and informal usage of terms that are degrading." 5
Non-hegemonic groups struggle to depart from the images of themselves
imposed upon them through renaming, or they will try to reclaim
derogatory names by subverting their traditional meanings. Most
obviously, feminists have exposed the gender bias within the English
language, where the terms "he," "him," "man," and "mankind" are
proffered as generic terms meant also to connote females, yet the historical
and modem reality is that they privilege male signifiers over female ones.
Feminists have also objected to animal pejoratives for women, such as
bitch, bunny, dog, cow, fox, chick, bird, etc., but the negative connotations
of animals have been excluded in their objections. 16 Such language is not
just a tool of gender socialization but is also an authoritative medium in
solidifying the immutability of difference between humans and animals.
117
Joan Dunayer illustrates how this works:
Viewed through speciesism, a nonhuman animal acquires a
negative image. When metaphor then imposes that image on
women, they share its negativity. Terming a woman a "dog"
carries the sexist implication that women have a special
obligation to be attractive, since the label refers to physical
appearance only when applied to females. And so, using
dog against any woman indirectly insults all women. The
affront to all dogs, however, is direct. Denied individual
identities, they merge into Ugly. Without this disdainful
view of dogs, dog would not offend. Similarly social
butterfly, being female specific, assigns gender to fickleness
and frivolity. The phrase would confer very different traits if
the butterfly's flight from flower to flower were perceived as
life-sustaining rather than trivial. Reserved for women,
113. Ursula K. LeGuin, She Unnames Them, in WE ARE THE STORIES WE TELL: THE
BEST SHORT STORIES BY NORTH AMERICAN WOMEN SINCE 1945 270, 272 (Wendy Martin
ed., 1990).
114. HOOKS, supra note 50, at 17-3 1.
115. MARI J. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY,
ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993).
116. Dunayer, supra note 9, at 11.
117. Id.
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dumb bunny links femaleness to mindlessness. But the
expression rests on the speciesist assumption that rabbits are
stupid.'18
And so on and so forth. The woman as bitch, and the bitch as herself,
are aggressive, ruthless, and callous. The woman as vixen and the vixen as
herself are cunning to the point of deceit, and the vixen is attractive as an
object worthy of relentless harassment and pursuit because she is a trophy
to be captured as prey by male predators." 9 Black women and men are
often referred to as monkeys, betraying the racist speciesism which gave
steam to social Darwinist human hierarchies and enslavement. 20  The
metaphor of "the human female/dark/poor body as x animal" operates at the
intersections of multiple Othering discourses, including those that
subordinate animals. Cultural critics must recognize the harmful effects of
animal pejoratives in order to uproot the dynamics of oppression.
4. Neoimperialism
Feminists, Marxists and postcolonialists have underscored how
Enlightenment ideology and its regimes of truth sanctified a narrative of
progress understood as unrestrained materialist development of the world's
natural resources. Recall McClintock's passage above in which she
discusses how Victorian ideas of femininity were not fully comprehensible
without discourses of imperial conquest with their narrative of exploitation
of nature as human progress.121 McClintock wants the reader to see the
emergence of gender within the metropolis as an inherent marker of racial
and national/imperial relations. For instance, ideas of womanhood were
not uniformly applied to all females, but rather their gendered treatment
was intimately interwoven with their race, national and class identities.
22
The idea of womanhood, and the cult of domesticity it entailed in
eighteenth-century Britain, was a gender ideal particular to middle- and
upper-class British women. Working-class and colonized women's class
and race marked them outside this protected preserve; they were inferior
and dewomanized because of their perceived embodied opposition to the
imperial private family arrangement with women relegated to the home and
men to the public sphere. Their bodies were then available for labor and
sexual violence in different ways than the "physically delicate" upper-
middle-class woman and the beastly colonized and working-class male.
23
The rise of Enlightenment capitalism was thus dependent on the
118. Id. at 12.
119. Id. at 15.
120. SPIEGEL, supra note 68.
121. MCCLNTOCK, supra note 15, at 79-80.
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123. Id. at 80.
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hierarchical Family of Man with its scientific racism and sexism of social
Darwinism.
McClintock evinces the depth of the connections between these
political and social identities in discussing the life of Arthur J. Munby, a
"well-known Victorian barrister and man of letters (1828-1910)" who
created a scandal in his will by declaring his forty-five year long desire and
love for, and revealing his thirty-six year long marriage to, his servant
Hannah Cullwick. Indeed, Munby was an ardent voyeur of the sexual lives
of working-class women.124 McClintock warns us not to chalk up this
infatuation to an apolitical expression of desire. Rather, she suggests that
Munby's voyeurism is a product of the imperial race, sexual and class
distinctions with which he was surrounded. In describing a rare riding
photo of Munby as a child, she writes:
Standing in erect profile, the infant strikes the pose of a
miniature metamorphosis of infant into man and is
eloquent of the social violence of male gendering.
Protruding from just below the boy's waist, [his whip]
symbolizes male mastery over two dimensions: the realm
of sexuality and the realm of labor. At one and the same
time, it is the peculiarly male emblem of phallic potency
and violent mastery of the work both of servants and of
beasts. In the precarious accession to masculinity, the
whip marks the boundary between women and men and
between men and animals, boundaries all the more
imprecise for having so often to be reinscribed. In the
logic of Munby's private (but far from idiosyncratic)
iconography, the metaphoric affinity of women and horses
is played out within scenarios that tirelessly equate female
sexuality and servitude.1
25
McClintock's argument helps us to see several points. First, she shows
us how the discourse of imperial conquest managed the contradictions of
class and racial gender identities within metropolitan society. Second, she
implicitly suggests that an emancipatory movement on one ground would
do itself violence by extending the moral community to cover more
humans, but not all. Thus, when British women argued for their
emancipation from a sexist patriarchy, 26 while supporting imperialism,
124. Id. at 76.
125. Id. at 80. McClintock also refers the reader to Leonore Davidoff, Class and
Gender in Victorian England, in SEX AND CLASS r;I WOMEN'S HISTORY 17 (Judith L.
Newton & Rebecca Walkowitz eds., 1983) where Davidoff "notes how Munby in his poetry
compares women with domesticated animals who have been 'broken in' by men." Id. at
405 n.10.
126. Please note that I am only talking about middle- and upper-class women here.
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they contradicted their own efforts because the gendered norms which
saturated European society were integral to the maintenance of imperialism
and organized its narratives. Both were based on the same metaphoric
hierarchies of European gender roles - the lack of culture and reason.
A full-fledged meaningful resistance to European patriarchy would
undermine the naturalized dichotomies that feminized European women as
subordinate. But the process would also undermine the feminization of all
those non-European Others that enabled imperialism: the supposed
egalitarian and normal gender relations of Europe which the "uncivilized"
colonies needed help to mirror.127 Undoing reason-based hierarchies would
undo imperialism as well because of the intersecting and interacting
dynamic of patriarchy and imperialism; supporting imperialism would be
akin to undermining European women's own claims to emancipation.
McClintock's argument is instructive. Advocating an end to human
oppressions while supporting animal oppression is self-defeating because
they are both upheld and mutually sustained by these binary categories.
Although she does not discuss the species element, she acknowledges in
this passage the precarious nature of the woman/man and man/animal
boundaries to demonstrate how ideas of sexuality, femininity and racial
hierarchy were premised on man's dominion over and separation from the
natural. We can extend her analysis to observe that the "beasts," who were
popularized as unquestionably inhuman, also became a potent marker of
European women and colonized people's dehumanized status and brought
to mind the progressive hierarchy of humanization and civilization. 28
There is another way of illuminating the intersecting character of
dominant social discourses. In addition to examining traditional foci of
cultural critique to examine how the concept of species difference helped
produce intrahuman differences, it is also possible to consider how
conventional animal rights foci, using hunting as an example, reveal the
interaction between oppressive social discourses.
5. Hunting
The animal defense critique of hunting lies in the principle that animals
should not be killed for human pleasure, environmental management,
Criticizing patriarchy would not have been sufficient to liberate lower-class women, whose
gendered oppression was just as much a factor of class politics as gender ones.
MCCLNTOCK, supra note 15, at 75-13 1.
127. UMA NARAYAN, DISLOCATING CULTURES: IDENTITIES, TRADITIONS AND THIRD
WORLD FEMrNISM 54 (1997).
128. Indeed, it is telling of the deep-rooted normalcy of the species divide that
McClintock's own observations about the metaphor of women as horses symbolizing their
servitude do not lead her explicitly to argue that species difference is a construct which also
emerged in intimate relation with ideas of sexuality, gender, race, and class with the rise of
imperialism, capitalism and the degradation of the so-called natural realm. Animal bodies
are just as much if not more inscribed as natural, whose sexuality and servitude were readily
available for human consumption and pleasure.
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or food.129 As Marti Kheel highlights in her excellent analysis, it is worth
repeating that arguments in defense of animals are frequently at odds with
those emanating from the environmental movement. 130  The conflict in
perspective is particularly pronounced in the hunting debate. The majority
of environmentalists will support some type of hunting, either in the name
of ecosphere balance, or even, remarkably, for the sake of communing
with nature and mimicking relationships indigenous cultures have with
nature; this experiential "hands-on" approach to nature is preferable over
abstract theorizing about environmental ethics.' 31 In contrast, animal
activists/theorists link hunting to animal genocide and perceive arguments
about natural harmony as just another excuse to kill animals. The violence
in hunting, however, is not restricted to animals alone. As the emerging
interdependent theory has shown, the violence of hunting derives
substantial force from gender, class and racial discourses of sexuality,
femininity and tradition.
Hunting is by and large a male segregated activity supported by
masculine ideologies, a fact which the preferred choice of prey reveals.
132
The most common target of hunters is the male deer. 33 The male deer
betrays the status of hunting as a practice of power rather than a "natural
function" of humans. As a symbol of virility, the ability to exert power
over the deer is understood as a confirmation of hegemonic masculinity.
34
The message which pervades the discourses of non-indigenous hunters who
claim to hunt for recreation, for environmental harmony or for spiritual
communion is that real men hunt.135 Hunting is encouraged as a return to
primitive roots when "we" lived in a more natural state and is regarded as
an expression of "an instinctive urge which, like the sexual drive, cannot
and should not be repressed.' 36 It is thus a healthy, normal and universal
bodily function for male human beings to hunt; it productively channels the
male urge to conquer toward a legitimate nonhuman target rather than
another human being. 37 Writings emerging from the early conservation
movements and current hunting magazines overflow with assertions that
129. The practice of hunting I refer to here is that practiced by nonindigenous
hunters. I will discuss the ethics of indigenous hunting in another article for the different
animal defense critique it attracts and its different implications.
130. Marti Kheel, License to Kill: An Ecofeminist Critique of Hunter's Discourse, in
ANIMALS & WOMEN: FEMINIST THEORETICAL EXPLORATIONS, supra note 78 at 85.
131. Id. at 86. Kheel traces the historical familiarity between hunting and the
environmental movement stemming from the early conservation movement, which has
formed an ethic of hunting that "has functioned both to camouflage and to legitimate
violence and biocide." 1d. at 86-87.
132. Id. at 88, citing a National Survey of the US Department of Interior.
133. SPIEGEL, supra note 68, at 57.
134. Id.
135. Kheel, supra note 130 (Kheel calls these the "happy hunter," the "holist
hunter," and the "holy hunter" respectively).
136. SPIEGEL, supra note 68, at 89, 105.
137. Id. at 89, 91.
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hunting is the ultimate expression of full naturalistic humanity and
masculinity.'1
38
It is simple to discern the problematic gendering and racializing that is
occurring within this discourse. In addition to the rigid gender roles it
supports, hunting also mimics the practice of sexual violation. As Kheel
points out:
Although many hunters downplay the actual moment of
the kill, most concede that it is an integral part of the hunt.
Just as the male orgasm typically is seen as the
denouement to the act of sex, so to, the death of the
animals is seen as the narrative resolution of the hunt.
Both the hunt and the sexual act are premised on the
notion of the buildup of tension; the orgasm and the kill
provide the sought-after relief.... A personal anecdote
may help shed some light on the hunting-sex
connection .... A number of years ago, I had the
occasion to attend a hunter safety training course, a course
that is required for every hunter to obtain a hunting
license .... Bullets were called "balls," firing was called
"discharge," and when a bullet hit an animal it was called
"penetration." The power of a gun was referred to as its
''penetration power." If a bullet was accidentally fired
before the intended moment, it was labeled a "premature
discharge." The law of "first blood" was also explained to
us. According to an unwritten law, which is recognized by
the Fish and Game department, whoever first "penetrates"
an animal and draws the "first blood" has the "privilege"
of "finishing the animal off," and claiming the body of the
animal as his own. The law of "first blood" had a familiar
ring. 139
Associations with the phallic imagery of human rape are clear. The
naturalization not only of animal slaughter but human rape is more subtle.
This naturalization of human rape via animals is nothing new.
Sociobiologists have sought to cast "rape as an adaptive strategy dictated
by evolution" based on their observations of the reproductive behavior of
nonhumans. 140  Human violence is thus legitimated as "genetically
programmed behavior that enhances the biological fitness of the male.' ' 1
138. Id. at 89-90.
139. Id. at 91-92.
140. Maria Comninou, Speech, Pornography and Hunting, in ANIMALS & WOMEN:
FEMINIST THEORETICAL EXPLORATIONS, supra note 78, at 126, 141.
141. Id.
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In the same vein, hunting celebrates this instinct to penetrate, implicitly
legitimating rape, and manages the inevitableness of this violence by
supplanting the human female body with an animal body.
But this displacement of the human body with the animal body has not
always been "necessary." Humans have hunted other humans in the same
display of power. As Marjorie Spiegel writes:
Is it just chance which gave us buck as the racist slang
term for a black man? Runaway slaves were hunted down
in much the same manner as animals are today. It was
common to employ specially trained dogs who were, in
fact, trained to hate negroes .... Until 1831 throughout
the South "there were men who made it a profession to
keep 'nigger dogs' and with them to follow up and catch
runaway slaves."'
142
There are further racialized elements to hunting if we consider the
prominence of the return-to-Nature discourse. We must ask, who must
return to nature? Certainly humans perceived as already immersed in
nature, or at least closer to nature than other humans, are not the reference
point. Indeed, it would seem to be a discordant justification for hunting if
hunting were primarily a female practice, since women are frequently
reduced to their naturalized reproductive functions.143 And it is unlikely to
be those racialized Others who are still seen as living in the past, left
behind by progress, denied coevalness with the rest of us in the West.
144
The call to return to nature, coupled with an invocation of indigenous ways,
is reminiscent of Rousseau's Noble Savage and the veneration of the racial
Other as an alternative to alienation generated by industrial capitalism. The
racial Other symbolized the simple harmony of man's pure existence
uncorrupted by Lockean theories of social contract and the drive to extract
ourselves from the natural.145 The unspoken tie between the primitive label
and indigenous cultures is too disquieting.
In context, hunting may be seen as a practice rather than a natural
human function, mediated through power dynamics fraught with species,
race, class, and sexual imagery. Similar to the discussion of pornography,
intimate violence, naming, and neoimperialism, a unidimensional view of
hunting does not capture the multiple and interactive dimensions of the
practice. In all of these examples, the species dimension operates to
142. HARRY H. JOHNSTON, THE NEGRO IN THE NEW WORLD 377-78 (1910), cited in
SPIEGEL, supra note 68, at 57 (1988).
143. SUSAN BoRDo, UNBEARABLE WEIGHT: FEMINISM, WESTERN CULTURE, AND THE
BODY (1993).
144. FABIAN & BUNZL, supra note 15.
145. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (Thomas P. Peardon ed.
1952) (1690).
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structure the discourses and thus the practices themselves.
C. SUMMARY
Cultural critique should expand to fully envelop animal issues within
its purview because they are intimately connected to human issues. The
stories told through dichotomous thought to uphold a rigid sense of species
difference and instrumental animal use in Western society are similar to
those that sustain human exploitation. Further, ideas of species difference
work in conjunction with other social forces familiar to humans (gender,
race, class, sexuality, etc.) to structure a multitude of social issues. To the
extent that cultural critics wish to address these issues and remain
committed to intersectionality in their theoretical frameworks, they need to
include and unpack species difference and oppression in their work.
CONCLUSION
Gender and other human-based oppressions are sustained by the very
same tropes that support the instrumental use of animals in our society.
Feminists and other cultural critics committed to dismantling these tropes
need to attend to the narratives about species and animal differences that
they establish to be consistent in their political positions and to fully undo
these tropes with respect to humans. It is a mistake for cultural critics to
presume that the construction of social reality ends at the human/nonhuman
boundary. Human as a category is no more a natural fact of science or
divinity than are ideas of gender, race, class, or sexuality; rather, it is a
difference we create through dichotomous modes of thinking and, however
systemically and at varying levels of consciousness, choose to privilege.
The term "human" and the social meanings assigned to it are recent
historical and cultural creations. The signifier is as contested and
contingent as current essentialism debates, questioning whether "women"
or "people of color" exist as social collectives, suggest intrahuman
identities to be.
What is more, by deconstructing prominent cultural critical and animal
advocacy foci, we evince the import that the ideas of human nature and
species difference have in animating hegemonic discourses and practices.
The modernist mentality of hierarchical dualisms, notably reason/emotion
and nature/culture, undergirds current perceptions, norms and judgments
about bodily difference in terms of sex, gender, race, sexuality and species.
Leaving out considerations of how humanity is constructed through species
difference will inevitably result in partial, incomplete, and hampered
critiques of human forms of oppression because these forms are shaped by
our ideas of animals. In other words, it is impossible to uproot racism, for
example, without consciously disrupting the human/animal divide because
racism is informed by understandings of species difference. For consistent,
nonarbitrary and effective transformative critiques, cultural critics must
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include animals within any ethical queries about what a just society looks
like. At the very least, this entails reflection on the continued merit of a
property status of animals.
